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EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE AND SPECIAL
EDUCATION LAW
School attendance is an experience common to virtually every citizen of the United States. Only a few of the most severely impaired will
have no contact with formal educational institutions. Education indeed
may be the prime characteristic of American democratic society., Although not presently recognized as a constitutionally protected right,2
education has been described by the United States Supreme Court as a
"legitimate entitlement ' 3 and "a right which must be made available to
all on equal terms' 4 for the good of society as well as of the individual.

5

Members of various minority groups, however, have encountered
serious problems in attempting to avail themselves of the benefits of
education. Consequently, these groups have been forced to seek redress in the courts 6 and in protective legislation. An example of such
legislation for the minority group collectively referred to as "the handi7
capped" is the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975.
The EAHCA extends and codifies various rights of handicapped children. It explains in detail the types of handicapped children for whom
the states are required to provide services, 8 the services which must be
made available, 9 and the procedural safeguards to be afforded.' 0 Jurisdiction of disputes is vested in federal courts without regard to the
amount in controversy."
Redress for infringement of educational rights also has been
sought by minority groups through judicial intervention.' 2 Although
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
3. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
4. 347 U.S. at 493.
5. Id.
6. E.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (Chinese children unable to understand English
instruction); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Negro children seeking an end to
racially segregated public schools); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania,
334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (per curiam), consent agreement approved and adopted, 343 F.
Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (retarded children seeking equal access to education).
7. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the EAHCA].
8. Id. §§ 1401(l), 1401(15).
9. Id. § 1401(16).
10. Id.§ 1415(b).
11. Id. § 1415(e)(4).
12. E.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (Chinese children unable to understand English
instruction); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (alleged discriminatory school financing on basis of wealth); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
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the most frequent remedy has been injunctive relief barring the alleged
discriminatory practice, 13 a few recent cases have been filed based on
negligence, termed educational malpractice. 14 In malpractice claims,
damages are sought from a professional practitioner as compensation
for an injury alleged to be a result of the professional's failure to perform at the level reasonably to be expected of members of that profession.15 Although most frequently seen in relation to the medical
profession, malpractice claims also have dealt with other professions
16
and with those employed in skilled trades.
For the handicapped, legislative provisions such as the EAHCA
may provide a basis for educational malpractice claims. In such cases,
the specific violation of a statutory duty defined in the legislation or its
related regulations may be proved more readily than a less well-defined
general allegation of failure to meet professional standards. The availability of this form of relief can be expected to have a broad impact on
the system of delivery of special education services to handicapped
children.
This note first will trace briefly the development of the concept of
the "right to education" and the extension of that right to handicapped
persons. A discussion of cases brought on behalf of handicapped children will explore in greater detail recent judicial attempts to clarify
their individual educational rights. Finally, an analysis and reconciliation of those decisions and the statutes will assist in projecting the future direction of educational malpractice litigation and in suggesting
standards to govern such litigation. It will be seen in the cases discussed below 17 that the courts generally have been unwilling to recognize a cause of action based on negligence. However, since the
EAHCA now provides specific statutory and regulatory requirements
for the conduct of educational programs and personnel, which may
serve as the standards of care, educational malpractice claims may be
expected to increase dramatically.
(racial segregation); Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (multiply-handicapped
children offered inappropriate educational program).
13. E.g., Frederick L. v. Thomas, 419 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Pa. 1976), a17'd, 557 F.2d 373 (3d
Cir. 1977); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
14. See, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1976); Pierce v. Board of Educ., 44 I11.App. 3d 324, 358 N.E.2d 67 (1976), rev'd, 69 111.
2d 89, 370 N.E.2d 535 (1977); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sup. Ct. App. Div.
1978); Donahue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 408 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. 1977), a7'd,407
N.Y.S.2d 874 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
15. See general, W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter referred to as
PROSSER].

16. Id.
17. See text accompanying notes 98-175 infra.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

THE RIGHT

To EDUCATION

The seminal case addressing individual rights and public education is Brown v. Boardof Education,'8 a suit attacking racially discriminatory segregation of public school children on fourteenth amendment
grounds. 19 The United States Supreme Court recognized the ultimate
societal value placed on education in a noteworthy passage, the gist of
which has been relied on in nearly every subsequent case 20 concerning
public education:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of
the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required
in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days,
it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed
in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide2 it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms. '
The Court concluded that the segregation of school children on the basis of race instilled in black children feelings of inferiority which impeded their motivation to learn. 22 Therefore, segregated educational
23
facilities were held to be inherently unequal.
A similar argument might be made on behalf of a handicapped
child. Education is a right highly valued by society and of primary
importance to the individual. Removing a child from the heterogeneous mainstream of the educational system denies the child full access to
that right. However, the right recognized by the Court in Brown was "a
right to equalized treatmentfor all who qualify for publicly supported
education under their respective state statutes. ' ' 24 This decision there18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i, provides in pertinent part:
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
20. Eg., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975);
Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978); Mills v. Board of
Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972); Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
21. 347 U.S. at 493.
22. Id. at 494.
23. Id. at 495.
24. Haggerty & Sacks, Education of the Handicapped:Towards a Definition of an Appropriate
Education, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 961, 963 (1977) (emphasis added) [hereinafter referred to as Haggerty &
Sacks].
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fore was not of immediate assistance to handicapped children because
a state was still permitted to exclude any child who was considered to
be unable to profit from formal education, since such children simply
would not qualify for the available educational programs. 25
The practice of excluding handicapped children was addressed in
McMillan v. Board of Education,26 where certain brain-damaged children were unable to attend public school because of an insufficient
number of special classes for them. The parents of the excluded braindamaged children claimed a violation of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment, and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit agreed that there was a substantial basis for such a
claim. 27 However, the court explained in dicta that there would be no
constitutional violation if the school district simply had refused to provide any special classes for brain-damaged children, since they would
not have qualified for admission to the standard classrooms. 28 It was
only because some of the brain-damaged children were excluded, while
others were admitted, that there was a substantial basis for a claim of a
denial of equal protection.
Although the dicta in McMillan suggested that a particular group
of handicapped children might be excluded from school simply by
eliminating special classes for children with their handicap, that alternative was rejected by the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania in PennsylvaniaAssociationfor Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania.29 The plaintiffs in P.A.R. C claimed that exclusion of mentally retarded children from a free public education
program violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because that constitutional provision requires access to an educational program for all children of school age. 30 The court accepted
expert testimony which indicated that "all mentally retarded persons
31
are capable of benefiting from a program of education and training,"
and that such education will contribute to achievement of a degree of
self-sufficiency. 3 2 The testimony also indicated that although it is preferable to commence education and training at a point early in life, the
25. Id.
26. 430 F.2d 1145 (2d Cir. 1970).
27. The Second Circuit remanded the cause to the district court for the convening of a threejudge panel to decide the merits of the plaintiffs' claim. Id. at 1150.
28. Id. at 1149.
29. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (per curiam), consent agreement approved andadopted,
343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as P.A.R.C].
30. 343 F. Supp. at 297.
31. 334 F. Supp. at 1259.
32. Id.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

retarded person is nevertheless able to benefit from such learning experiences at any age. 33 The school district was enjoined from continuing to exclude the retarded children, and it entered into a consent
agreement with the plaintiffs which was subsequently approved by the
34

court.

In Mills v. Board of Education,35 the mandatory provision of a free
and appropriate public education was expanded to include all handicapped children. 36 The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia found that excluding handicapped children from school was
contrary to the intent of local statutes requiring parents to see that their
children attended school, 37 under threat of criminal sanction. 38 Such
sanction, the court held, "presupposes that an educational opportunity
will be made available to the children" 39 and that "[t]he Board of Education is required to make such opportunity available. ' 40 The court in
Mills issued a lengthy order 4 1 which delineated elements of a constitutionally equal education for the handicapped. These elements, many of
which had been previously addressed in P.A.R. C and subsequently included in the EAHCA, consisted of the following: (1) a suitable education for all children, regardless of the degree or multiplicity of
handicapping condition(s); 42 (2) an individualized program of evaluation and compensatory educational services; 4 3 (3) placement in the setting least restrictive of the child's interaction with nonhandicapped
children; 44 and (4) procedural due process safeguards, relating chiefly
to proper notice to the handicapped child and his parents and to a
hearing prior to any proposed change of a child's educational place-

33. Id.
34. Id. at 1258-67; 343 F. Supp. at 303-16.
35. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
36. Id. at 874-75.
37. Id. at 874, citing D.C. CODE §§ 31-201, 31-203 (1973).
38. Id, citing D.C. CODE § 31-207 (1973).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 877-83. The district court's order reminds the reader of a statement from
McRedmond v. Wilson, 533 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1976): "A Federal judge rearranging a State's...
educational system is like a man feeding candy to his grandchild. He derives a great deal of
personal satisfaction from it and has no responsibility for the results." Id. at 766 (Von Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
42. 348 F. Supp. at 878; P.A.R.C, 334 F. Supp. at 1266 (referring only to mentally retarded).
See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B) (1976).
334 F. Supp. at 1266 (mentally retarded). See 20 U.S.C. §
43. 348 F. Supp. at 879; PARC.,
1414(a)(5) (1976).
44. 348 F. Supp. at 879; P.A.R.C., 334 F. Supp. at 1264 (mentally retarded). See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(5)(B) (1976).
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ment. 4 5
Although the defendant school board in Mills protested that lack
of funds precluded it from offering programs to handicapped children,
the court relied on Goldberg v. Kell 6 in stating that "[c]onstitutional
'4 7
rights must be afforded citizens despite the greater expense involved.
However, the Mills court drew its parallel to Goldberg in terms of com-

peting state interests rather than focusing on individual constitutional

rights. 48 In Goldberg, the Court ruled in favor of the public interest in
preventing erroneous termination of a welfare recipient's benefits over
a competing state interest in fiscal efficiency. 49 In Mills, the court held
that "the District of Columbia's interest in educating the excluded children clearly must outweigh its interest in preserving its financial resources." 50 The District of Columbia was instructed to assure that
available educational funds were expended equitably, so as to avoid

discrimination against handicapped children. 5'

In sum, the decisions discussed above indicated that handicapped
children do indeed have a right to access to educational programs, and
they suggested broad outlines for these programs. However, the right
was not yet firmly established, and there continued to be a need for
refinement and specificity of the educational rights of handicapped
children.
45. 348 F. Supp. at 879-83; P.A.R.C, 334 F. Supp. at 1266 (mentally retarded). See 20
U.S.C. § 1415 (1976).
46. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The Court held that welfare recipients were entitled to the continued payment of benefits unless due process safeguards such as notice and hearing were provided
to the recipient prior to termination of benefits for good cause. Although the defendant contended
that imposing these safeguards was too great a burden in terms of administrative costs and time,
the Court nevertheless held that the state could streamline the procedures "to minimize these
increased costs" and that the importance of the benefits to the recipients was too great to be
outweighed by fiscal considerations. Id. at 266.
47. 348 F. Supp. at 876.
48. The Court in Goldberg found that the continued receipt of welfare benefits was a statutory entitlement, 397 U.S. at 262. The Mills court did not directly address the question of whether
education was either an "entitlement" or a constitutionally-protected right, but it apparently relied
on the latter. See 348 F. Supp. at 875-76. The Court reached a different conclusion the following
year in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973), in which it
refused to find education a fundamental interest. There continues to be a broad range of differing
opinions concerning education vis-A-vis fundamental rights or interests. See, e.g., Martin Luther
King Jr. Elementary School Children v. Michigan Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 1324, 1327-28 (E.D.
Mich. 1978) (education is not a fundamental interest); Cuyahoga County Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Essex, 411 F. Supp. 46, 50 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (education is not a fundamental right); Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 958 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (minimum level of education is a
constitutional right); Crawford v. Board of Educ., 17 Cal. 3d 280, 130 Cal. Rptr. 724, 551 P.2d 28
(1976) (education is a fundamental interest).
49. 397 U.S. at 266.
50. 348 F. Supp. at 876.
51. Id.
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DEFINING THE EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS OF HANDICAPPED CHILDREN

A question not addressed by Mills v. Board of Education5 2 is how
to define equitable allocation of funds among handicapped and nonhandicapped children. If a child needs specialized services because of
his handicap, one may question whether it is equitable to spend only
the same amount for the education of a handicapped child, dollar for
dollar, as for that of a nonhandicapped child. On the other hand, if
more is spent on the education of the handicapped child, others may
question whether the nonhandicapped child is being discriminated
against, in violation of the equal protection clause.
One way of analyzing whether funds are being allocated in an equitable manner turns on whether equality of education is measured by
"input" or "output." "Input" deals with the equal provision of relatively concrete elements, such as teacher/student ratios, course offerings, or physical plants, disregarding whether the students served have
the same needs and potential. 53 "Output" deals with attempts to produce roughly equal results in the performance of students, despite dissimilar backgrounds and abilities, by providing a variety of educational
resources, depending on individual needs. 54 Legislation5" and judicial
decisions5 6 thus far suggest that the "output" measure has been
adopted by legislative and judicial bodies, assuring handicapped children access to educational resources which differ from those available
to the nonhandicapped.
Defining equality in terms of output is an expensive course to pursue. Congress, however, recognized the expense attendant upon providing special services when it enacted the EAHCA, which makes
funds available for states to utilize in devising comprehensive educational programs 57 for all handicapped children from ages three to
twenty-one. 58 The requirements of the EAHCA increasingly have been
relied upon in continuing efforts to define the educational rights of
handicapped children.
52. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). See text accompanying notes 35-51 supra.
53. See Haggerty & Sacks, supra note 24, at 964.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., EAHCA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S:C.
§§ 701-794 (1976). See note 61 infra with regard to the Rehabilitation Act.
56. See cases discussed in text accompanying notes 26-51 supra and 59-94 infra.
57. 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (1976).
58. Id. § 1412(2)(B). Services were to be available for handicapped children between ages
three and eighteen by September I, 1978, and the upper age limit is to be increased to age twentyone by September I, 1980.
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In Hairston v. Drosick,59 the parents of a physically handicapped
child, Trina, sued their school district for refusing to admit the child to
classes unless her mother attended her special physical needs. 60 The
United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia
held that, since Trina was otherwise able to profit from the instruction
in regular classes, conditioning her right to education on the attendance
of her mother was a violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 6 ' and that her

summary exclusion had not afforded her due process as guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment 6 2 and mandated by state regulations. 63 Although specific sections of the EAHCA were mentioned in the opinion, 64 they were cited only in connection with the Rehabilitation Act or
with state regulations. 6 5 It appears that the court did not rely on the
66
EAHCA in reaching its decision because the act was not yet in effect.
The court's citation of the EAHCA's provisions, however, emphasized
Congress' intent to provide educational services to the handicapped.
Less significance was given to the EAHCA the following year by
the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in Eberle v. Boardof Education.67 In Eberle, the parents of a
child with a profound hearing loss brought suit against their school
district in a dispute over the special program best suited to their child's
69
exceptional needs. 68 Despite the jurisdictional grant in the EAHCA,
59. 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.W. Va. 1976).
60. Trina suffered from spina bifida, leaving her with bowel incontinence. This incontinence
occasioned the need for attention two or three times during each school day. It apparently was the
contention of the defendant school district that responsibility for this "clean-up" did not lie with
them but with the child's parents.
61. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as
the Rehabilitation Act], states in part that "[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual...
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). Since federal funds comprise a major segment of the
financial support of state educational systems, public schools fall within the aegis of the Rehabilitation Act. Id.
62. See note 19 supra.
63. 423 F. Supp. at 184-85. The court explained that the state regulations were promulgated
"pursuant to the mandate of federal law as contained in 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(13) .
I d. at
184.
64. See 423 F. Supp. at 184. The court refers to 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(13) (now codified at 20
U.S.C. §§, 1414(a)(1)(C)(iv) and 1414(a)(7) (1976)), which mandates placement in the environment
least restrictive of the handicapped child's interaction with nonhandicapped peers, and which requires procedural safeguards.
65. See 423 F. Supp. at 184.
66. 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (1976) sets October 1, 1977, as the effective date of the amending act,
whereas the date of the opinion is January 14, 1976.
67. 444 F. Supp. 41 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
68. Prior to 1976, the handicapped child, Stephen, had attended at public expense a private
school which taught the child to use his residual hearing ability. Beginning with the 1976-77
school year, defendant school district offered a program for deaf children which utilized alterna-
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which was cited by the plaintiffs, the court dismissed the case for lack
of jurisdiction. 70 Although the complaint was filed after the effective
date of the EAHCA, 7' the court found that the questionable acts of the
school district had occurred prior to that date. Therefore, "[s]ince the
power base of the act is the funding of state programs, [it] cannot become binding on the states prior to the funding to which it is attached. '72 In its final remarks, the court admitted that "[tihe practical
effect of this decision may be somewhat temporary, ' 73 since the "regulations appear to entitle parents to a hearing each year." 74 Although
the court did not question the rights of handicapped children, it found
these rights to be available only as a function of a funding statute. Although the analogy was not raised by the plaintiffs in Eberle, it is difficult to reconcile that dismissal with the Supreme Court's ruling in
Goldberg v. Kely 75 that financial concerns may not be given preference
76
over constitutional concerns.
According to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the rights assured to handicapped children by the
EAHCA were not limited by the effective date of the act. In Kruse v.
Campbell,77 that court heard a class action suit brought by handicapped children and their parents which challenged the constitutionality of a state tuition grant program for handicapped students. In cases
where the public schools had no special education program available
that was appropriate for a handicapped child, the child could attend a
private school that offered such a program. Expenses for this private
school were partially reimbursed through the public school district's
tuition grant program. Some parents, such as the plaintiffs, were unable to afford those costs of private schooling which were not reimbursed by the school district. Plaintiffs therefore claimed that the grant
program violated equal protection and due process, as well as the Rehabilitation Act, in that their children were denied a free appropriate
tive means of communication, particularly signing and finger spelling. Differences in effectiveness
of the two types of programs have been hotly debated among educators of the deaf for many
years. In the present case, Stephen's parents apparently felt that the former program was more
appropriate for him and that moving him from that approach to a program utilizing "total communication" would deprive Stephen of the education most appropriate to his needs.
69. 29 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976).
70. 444 F. Supp. at 42.
71. See note 66 supra.
72. 444 F. Supp. at 44.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
76. Id. at 266.
77. 431 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Va.), vacated and remanded,434 U.S. 808 (1977).
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public education. Defendants contended that the Rehabilitation Act
actually was "designed to prohibit discrimination in employment and
vocational training, not education, ' 78 and that although the EAHCA
does apply to education, it was not targeted forfull funding until September 1, 1978 (nearly one year after its initial effective date). Therefore, the defendants in Kruse argued that it should not be
"retrospectively applied. ' 79
The Kruse court concluded that the intent of Congress in enacting
the EAHCA was to reinforce an already-existing right: "[T]he right to
education of handicapped children is a present right, one which should
be implemented immediately." 80 However, the challenge to the validity of the tuition grant program was not decided on the basis of the
Rehabilitation Act or of the EAHCA, but on equal protection grounds.
The Kruse court relied on San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,81 in which the United States Supreme Court suggested a
hypothetical situation wherein a state imposed tuition requirements for
its public schools, thereby precluding poor children from receiving an
education. 82 Such a situation, according to the Court, would have compelled "judicial assistance." 83 The court in Kruse pointed out that the
plaintiffs were in precisely the same situation as that hypothesized by
the United States Supreme Court. "As a consequence, these children
sustain an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy
the benefits of an appropriate education, while other handicapped
school children in the state receive a publicly supported and appropriate education. Such a discriminatory exclusion . . . is violative of
equal protection ....-84 On appeal, 85 the United States Supreme
Court vacated and remanded the case, directing the district court to
decide the claim on the basis of the Rehabilitation Act. This apparently reflected the general policy of deciding a case on statutory
86
grounds, where available, rather than on constitutional grounds.
78. Id. at 185.
79. Id. The reasoning here is similar to that in Eberle, 444 F. Supp. 41 (W.D. Pa. 1977). See
text accompanying notes 67-76 supra.
80. Id. at 186, citing S. REP. No. 94-168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1975), reprintedin [1975]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1441.

81. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
82. Id. at 25 n.60.
83. Id.
84. 431 F. Supp. at 187.
85. 434 U.S. 808 (1977).
86. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 441
(1821). There may have been more involved in the remanding of the Kruse case than the general
preference for statutory grounds for lower court decisions. In citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973),
the Kruse court was relying on a case where the United States Supreme Court held that education
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Since the Rehabilitation Act was already in effect when the complaint
was filed, 87 with provisions basically the same as those in the EAHCA,
there is little question that the district court's final decision will be the
same when based on the statute rather than on the fourteenth amendment.
Despite differing interpretations of relevant statutes and their effective dates, there appears to have been a general consensus in the
Hairston, Eberle, and Kruse decisions that handicapped children, as
well as nonhandicapped, enjoy the right of access to educational opportunities. In Stuart v. Nappi,88 the district court's decision in favor of the
plaintiff suggests that handicapped children may even have more
rights, or at least qualitatively different ones, than their nonhandicapped peers. The plaintiff in Stuart had been classified "learning disabled" and enrolled in a special compensatory class. Although she
stopped attending this class, the school authorities took no further
steps, such as re-evaluation of the appropriateness of the placement,
until plaintiff participated in a disturbance at the school, whereupon
she was summarily expelled. The United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut found that the plaintiff handicapped child was
not subject to the school's disciplinary procedures providing for expulsion. The court construed the EAHCA to allow strong disciplinary
measures against a handicapped child; however, expulsion would run
counter to the child's right to education in the least restrictive environment. 89 Instead, the rules promulgated pursuant to the EAHCA have
outlined a procedure allowing for a change in the child's placement 90 to
a program better suited to the needs of a disruptive child. In mentioning its reluctance to interfere with the school's disciplinary code, the
court pointed out that suspension was still an available alternative for
was not a fundamental interest. Id. at 35-36. A minimal level of scrutiny is utilized to examine an
alleged violation of equal protection when neither a suspect class nor a fundamental interest is
involved. Id. at 98 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In such cases, the state's conduct has invariably
been found to be reasonable and nonviolative of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 109 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). In Kruse, however, the state's practice was held unconstitutional, so a strict level of
scrutiny was apparently used. This would indicate the presence of a fundamental interest or a
suspect class, even though the Supreme Court had not recognized education as a fundamental
interest, id. at 35-36, nor "the poor" as a suspect class, id. at 29. Deciding the Kruse case on a
statutory basis would avoid this complication of the already confusing situation in equal protection litigation and would reserve to future Supreme Court decisions the definition of fundamental
interests and suspect classes, 411 U.S. at 70-123 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
87. The effective date was September 26, 1973. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
88. 443 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1978).
89. Id. at 1242-43. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1976).
90. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.552 (1977). The regulation allows a change in the child's placement
when his behavior significantly impairs the education of others.
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short-term relief,9 1 as well as a possible change in the child's placement
to a closely structured program for a more long-term effect. 92 Nevertheless, the court in Stuart concluded that the procedural due process
safeguards of the EAHCA, 93 including notice and the opportunity for a
94
hearing prior to a change in placement, must be observed.
MALPRACTICE: THE NEXT STEP IN SPECIAL EDUCATION LITIGATION

It appears that the constitutional safeguards of due process and
equal protection are now interpreted to assure handicapped children
access to educational opportunities which are at least equal to those of
nonhandicapped children. Furthermore, insofar as handicapped children are able to benefit from the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act 9 5
and the EAHCA, 96 they may even have rights beyond those afforded
nonhandicapped children, in accordance with the "output" measure
adopted by Congress in these acts. 97 It may therefore be logical to expect that if one of these "extra" rights is violated, a handicapped child
may be able to seek an additional remedy.
In Howard S, v. Friendswood Independent School District,98 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas suggested that such an additional remedy might be available. In this case,
the court considered the plight of a child, Douglas, who suffered minimal brain damage, learning disability, and emotional disturbance.
Douglas participated in special education classes until he entered high
school; however, his behavior deteriorated when the high school
treated him as a discipline problem rather than as a handicapped child.
When Douglas' problems required psychiatric hospitalization and subSequent private school placement, the school district officially dropped
him from the rolls and refused to consider itself responsible for Douglas' education. On the basis of the Rehabilitation Act, the EAHCA,
and the fifth and fourteenth amendments, the court ordered the school
district to evaluate Douglas' educational needs immediately, to develop
91. 443 F. Supp. at 1243.
92. Id.
93. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(C) (1976), provides, in pertinent part:
The procedures required by this section shall include, but shall not be limited to .
written prior notice to the parents or guardian of the child whenever such agency or unit
. . . proposes to initiate or change . . . the identification, evaluation, or educational
placement of the child.
94. 443 F. Supp. at 1243.
95. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976).
96. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976).
97. See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
98. 454 F. Supp. 634 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
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an individual educational program for him, to provide for the educational services needed by Douglas, and to pay the accrued costs of his
private education. 99 The court found that Douglas' parents had scrupulously observed their responsibilities in seeking resolution of their
differences with the school district over the child's educational placement. The school district, in the court's estimation, had been less than
observant of its responsibilities, and the court suggested that a handicapped child in Douglas' situation might well seek damages in addition
to injunctive relief. The court stated:
This Court has concluded that the Board of Trustees of [Friendswood Independent School District] has received extremely poor advice concerning its legal obligations and the possible liability of
individual administratorsand Trustees .

.

.. [T]he attention of the

Board of Trustees is respectfully directed to the possibility ofpersonal
liability being imposed upon school board members for failure to
comply with their legal obligations. ...

lOO

The allusion by the court to the possibility of personal liability in
an action against school officials or employees points toward educational malpractice litigation.10 In bringing a suit of this kind, it appears that there are three appropriate bases available to define the
standard of care expected of school personnel: 10 2 (1) failure to perform the duties expected of an educational professional; 10 3 (2) failure
to exercise the degree of care expected of an educational professional in
the discharge of his or her responsibilities;"° 4 and (3) violation of a
statutory standard which delineates behavior required of an educational professional.10 5 The third of these bases would be the most spe99. Id. at 636, 641-43.
100. Id. at 638 (emphasis added). Although it should be noted that these statements are dicta,
they suggest that the Board may have a malpractice claim against its legal counsel.
101. See text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
102. Although teachers are referred to as examples, the same principles would apply to any
professional employed in the public schools, such as school psychologists, school social workers,
or principals, as well as to the school district board responsible for the professionals' activities.
103. See, e.g., Pierce v. Board of Educ., 44 I11. App. 3d 324, 358 N.E.2d 67 (1976), rev'd, 69 I11.
2d 89, 370 N.E.2d 535 (1977). School personnel have been described as being in locoparentis in
relation to students during the child's school attendance. This implies that the school has assumed
parental obligations and is charged with certain duties, including education. A position in loco
parentisis generally considered to be a fiduciary relationship, and school personnel would therefore be expected to place a high value on the child's best interests concerning education. See
generally 59 AM. JUR. 2d, Parent and Child, § 88 (1971).
104. See, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1976). See also text accompanying notes 15-16 supra, discussing the level of expertise
expected from a professional. In the medical profession, a specialist is held to a higher standard of
expertise than a non-specialist, when working in the particular area of specialty. See PROSSER,
supra note 15. This could imply that a special education teacher is under a greater duty than is a
teacher in the standard program.
105. Failure to comply with a duty implied by statute may evidence negligence per se where
the statute was intended to protect the class of persons represented by the plaintiff, and violation
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cific and therefore the most susceptible to clear definition as the
standard of care, as well as to proof of its breach as the proximate cause
of damage. The first two bases do not discriminate among the many
factors which impinge on the educational process. A child's innate potential obviously affects her achievement. The learning materials provided by the school limit the topics that are addressed and the extent to
which they are pursued. The teacher's background and training determine, albeit unconsciously, the approach to the tasks of teaching. A
child's self-expectations and her perceptions of the expectations placed
on her by parents, teachers, and other children modify her rate of
learning. The myriad factors affecting learning "may be physical, neurological, emotional, cultural, environmental; they may be present but
not perceived, recognized but not identified."'°6 Therefore, it would be
easier to identify a teacher's failure to observe specific, statutorily-prescribed behavior than to attempt to isolate that teacher's general conduct, from all other factors affecting learning, as the proximate cause of
a child's failure.
The second and third bases for the duty of care, those of failure to
exercise the degree of care expected of an educational professional in
the discharge of responsibilities, and violation of a statutory standard,
were utilized by the plaintiff in Peter W v. San Francisco Unified School
District.0 7 In this case, a high school graduate brought a tort action
against his former school district. The plaintiff alleged negligence in
seven counts that encompassed failure to provide adequate instruction
and failure to exercise the requisite degree of care expected from professional educators in discharging their responsibilities. The existence
of the duty of care allegedly had three bases: 0 8 (1) voluntary assumption of duty; (2) quasi-fiduciary relationship between student and
teacher; and (3) community custom. The plaintiff also alleged breach
of a mandatory duty owed him. 0 9 General damages were sought,
of the statute occasioned the type of harm against which the statute was intended to protect.
PROSSER, supra note 15, at § 36.
106. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 878 (1978), citing Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 824, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861
(1976) (footnote omitted).
107. 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1976).
108. Id. at 820-21, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
109. Id. at 827, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862. The plaintiff based his claims regarding mandatory duty
on: (1) CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10759 (West 1973) (keeping parents advised of their child's educational progress); (2) CAL. CONST. art. 9 (instructing students in basic skills); (3) CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 8574 (West 1973), now codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51225 (West 1978) (requiring demonstration of basic skills proficiencies as a condition for high school graduation); (4) CAL. EDUC. CODE

§§

1053, 8002 (West 1973), now codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 35292, 72236, 51041 (West 1978)

(evaluation by governing board of district's educational program); (5) CAL. EDUC. CODE § 8505
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based on the plaintiff's inability to find employment, as were special
damages for the cost of the remedial tutoring which was subsequently
required.
The California Appellate Court's major consideration was the definition of the appropriate duty of care. The court in Peter W made
clear that the "judicial recognition of such duty in the defendant. . . is
initially to be dictated or precluded by considerations of public policy." 1 1 0 Negligence liability in California was based on a statute"'
which expressed the principle that "[a]ll persons are required to use
ordinary care to prevent others being injured as the result of their conduct,,i 12 but that departures from this principle were to be made when
indicated by public policy. Among the policy considerations cited by
the court were:
[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing
future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with
resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. 13
Finally, according to the Peter W court, even where these factors
are found to support a new area of tort liability, the alleged breach
must be amenable to assessment within the existing judicial framework. 114 The court held that "educational malfeasance" was not so
amenable because no commonly accepted rule of educational methodology existed and because the results of instruction were subject to influence by factors beyond the control of teachers and administrators.' 1 5
The court concluded that public schools are already overburdened by
social and financial problems and that imposing liability for educational malpractice would be unreasonable in terms of costs to society in
public time and money." 6 With regard to the claim of breach of a
(West 1973), now codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51204 (West 1978) (designing the public school
course of instruction according to the needs of the students).
110. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 822, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
111. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714 (West 1973).
112. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 823, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859 (citing Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108,
112, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (1968)).
113. Id., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60 (citing Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112-13, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 100, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (1968)).
114. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 824, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
115. Id. at 824, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61. Seealso discussion in text following note 105 supra.
116. The court stated:
Few of our institutions, if any, have aroused the controversies, or incurred the public
dissatisfaction, which have attended the operation of the public schools during the last

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

mandatory statutory duty,' 1 7 the court stated simply that the statutes
relied upon, which related to reporting student progress to parents, requiring basic proficiencies before graduation, and providing and evaluating an appropriate curriculum, were not designed to protect students
against the risk of injury, but instead to attain optimal educational resuits. " 8 The lower court's dismissal for failure to state a cause of action was therefore affirmed." 9
20
The facts in Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District
were similar to those in Peter W, and the Donohue court relied heavily
on the earlier opinion in reaching its decision that no cause of action
had been stated. However, the court in Donohue did point out that in
some instances a cause of action for educational malpractice would be
valid: "[Aill teachers and other officials of our schools bear an important public trust and may be held to answer for the failure to faithfully
perform their duties."' 2' The reference to a teacher's failure to perform
duties suggests that where those duties can be clearly identified and
separated from relative dependence on factors beyond the teacher's
control, it would be possible to hold the teacher liable for failure to
perform them. This process of identification and separation should be
possible where a duty is clearly delineated in a statute. However, the
plaintiff in Donohue was unsuccessful in asserting the violation of a
statutory duty. In the court's view, the legislation relied upon 22 simply
expressed the intent of the legislature to create a system of free public
schools and thereby "to confer the benefits of a free education upon
what would otherwise be an uneducated public,"' 23 not to confer a
24
cause of action on an individual studeht.
Problems with proximate causation also were noted by the court in
few decades. Rightly or wrongly, but widely, they are charged with outright failure in
the achievement of their educational objectives; according to some critics, they bear responsibility for many of the social and moral problems of our society at lare. Their
public plight in these respects is attested in the daily media, in bitter governing board
elections, in wholesale rejections of school bond proposals, and in survey upon survey.
To hold them to an actionable duty of care, in the discharge of their academic functions,
would expose them to the tort claims-real or imagined--of disaffected students and
parents in countless numbers.
60 Cal. App. 3d at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
117. See note 109 supra.
118. 60 Cal. App. 3d at 826, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
119. Id. at 828, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
120. 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
121. Id. at 878.
122. N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 3201-3243 (McKinney 1970 and Supp. 1978-79). This legislation
refers to compulsory education and precludes exclusion from or assignment to specific schools on
the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin.
123. 407 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
124.

Id.
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Donohue. The court stated that "failure to learn does not bespeak a
failure to teach."' 25 Thus, the court did not feel it possible to judge
from a student's level of performance whether a teacher failed to instruct that student appropriately. The court concluded that "[educational personnel] may not be sued for damages by an individual
student for an alleged failure to reach certain educational objectives." 126

With regard to the alleged violation of a statutory standard, the
dissent in Donohue127 referred to a statute 2 8 which was in effect during
the time the plaintiff was attending high school classes. This statute
required that "under-achievers" be evaluated and possibly placed in
special education classes. Although the plaintiff fell within the definition of under-achiever, he was not evaluated. The dissent concluded
that "the plaintiff has, therefore, shown the existence of a mandatory
statutory duty flowing from the defendant to him personally and has
alleged the breach thereof by the defendant. To dismiss the complaint
"... would merely serve to sanction misfeasance in the educational system."129 Justice Suozzi30 further pointed out in his dissent that fears of
"a flood of litigation"' were probably unjustified, considering the history of cases following the abolition of sovereign immunity, where a
similar "flood" had been feared but had not materialized.' 3' He stated,
"there is no reason to differentiate between educational malpractice on
the one hand, and other forms of negligence and malpractice litigation
... ."32 The majority responded to this position, however, by placing
the onus on the plaintiff. Since the plaintiff and his parents were aware
of his lack of progress, the majority held, they should have requested
33
the evaluation and insisted that it be conducted.
The dissent in Donohue also approached the problem regarding
proximate cause differently than had the majority. The majority would
determine as a matter of law whether the statute was designed to protect the class of which the plaintiff was a member from an injury the
statute was designed to prevent. However, Justice Suozzi stated in his
dissenting opinion that "[w]hether the failure of the plaintiff to achieve
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 881.
Id. at 878.
Id. at 881 (Suozzi, J., dissenting).
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4404 (McKinney Supp. 1978-79).
407 N.Y.S.2d at 884 (Suozzi, J., dissenting).
Id. at 883.

131.

Id.

132. Id.
133.

Id. at 880-81.
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• . .was caused by the negligence of the school system,. . . or was the
product of forces outside the teaching process, is really a question of
' 34
proof to be resolved at a trial."'
It is unlikely that a plaintiff will be able to demonstrate that a
school district employee failed to exercise the degree of care expected
of an educational professional in carrying out his or her responsibilities, so far as educational malpractice is concerned. Demonstrating
that the employee failed to observe a statutory requirement is more
likely to meet with success. Both the Rehabilitation Act and the
EAHCA, as well as state statutes 3 5 and regulations, 36 list specific behaviors expected of various educational personnel and may provide a
statutory standard of care.
In Pierce v. Board of Education137 the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant school district had violated a statutory duty 138 to evaluate
the plaintiff handicapped child, Kerry, and to provide special education
services. Kerry had been diagnosed by several privately-retained physicians as suffering from a specific learning disability. Despite being
informed of these diagnostic findings, the school district failed for three
years prior to the filing of the complaint to provide the requested services. As a result of this failure, Kerry allegedly "sustained severe and
permanent emotional and psychic injury requiring hospitalization and
medical treatment for his injuries." '13 9 The Illinois Appellate Court reversed a lower court dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action. However, the appellate decision was not based on a
finding that the school district had failed in its statutory duty, but
rather in its duty to care for the plaintiff, which duty arose because of
the defendant's position of in locoparentis.14o
On appeal,' 4' the Illinois Supreme Court ignored the in locoparen134. Id.at 883 (emphasis added).
135. Eg., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 14-1.01 to 14-9.01 (1977).
136. Eg., Illinois Rules and Regulations to Govern the Administration and Operation ofSpecial
Education (Feb. 1, 1979), art. IX § 9.02(4) (annual screening by teachers for referral of children);
§ 9.09(3)(i)(1) (evaluation by a certified school psychologist for certain children) [hereinafter referred to as Illinois Rules].
137. 44 11. App. 3d 324, 358 N.E.2d 67 (1976), rev'd, 69 I11.
2d 89, 370 N.E.2d 535 (1977).
138. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-8.01 (1977). The statute requires that the Superintendent of
Public Instruction issue rules and regulations governing special education, requires individual
case studies for children as a basis for determining eligibility for special education, sets parameters
for dates of special education placement, and calls for informing parents concerning their child's
special needs.
139. 44 Ill.
App. 3d at 325, 358 N.E.2d at 68.
140. Id.
141. 69 I11.
2d 89, 370 N.E.2d 535 (1977).
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tis argument but did consider the statute 14 2 relied on by the plaintiff.
The statute, the court held, did not establish a duty upon the local
school district to place individual students. Instead, the court found
that such duty of placement rested with the State Board of Education. 143 Although the local district is initially responsible for evaluation
and placement of children in special education settings, if it fails to do
so, the parent or guardian should pursue a series of reviews which ultimately reach the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. The final
decision thus is a function of that office. 44 Since the plaintiff had not
pursued the required series of administrative reviews, the case was dis45
missed. 1
It appears that although the plaintiff in Pierce chose the more
readily demonstrable basis for the standard of care, that of violation of
a statutory duty, the court was constrained by public policy considerations. 146 There seems to be no other explanation of why the court
would relieve a school district of the consequences of failing to observe
its statutory duties by placing the onus for policing the school district
on the student and his parents. This is an especially heavy burden,
since it is unlikely that many parents would be aware of the district's
responsibilities unless they were informed of them by the district itself.147 Further, while the statute relied on by the court provides for
oversight of special education by the State Board of Education, this is
purely an administrative function. Reviews at intermediate levels and
ultimately at the state level could order the desired change in placement. 4 8 However, securing this change by exhaustion of administrative remedies would not obtain redress for the damages sought through
142. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-4.01 (1977). See note 138 supra.
143. 69 I11. 2d at 93, 370 N.E.2d at 536-37 (relying on ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-8.01
(1977)).
144. 69 Ill. 2d at 94, 370 N.E.2d at 537.
145. Id.
146. The majority in Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Sup.
Ct. App. Div. 1978), had similarly been constrained by public policy considerations. See text
accompanying notes 120-34 supra.
147. In Illinois, school districts are required to inform parents of the appeal procedure. See
lllinois Rules, supra note 136, art. IX, § 9.01(2)(b), providing in pertinent part:
Each local district shall develop and implement procedures for creating public awareness
of special education programs and for advising the public of the ri htsofexceptional
children. ...
Procedures developed by the district.., shall include, but need not be
limited to:. . . An annual dissemination of information to the community served by the
school district regarding . . . the rights of exceptional children.
The "rights of exceptional children" would include the right to appeal regarding placement.
However, the court neither referred to this responsibility nor investigated whether the duty had
been honored by the district, prior to shifting responsibility to Kerry's parents.
148. Illinois Rules, supra note 136, art. X, §§ 10.10, 10.21.
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a negligence action.149 The difference is comparable to that between a
suit for damages and one for injunctive relief. Under the reasoning of
the Pierce court, it would be impossible to obtain redress for injuries.
In addition, the court failed to observe that the responsibility for special education, as viewed by the Illinois Office of Education, lies with
the local district as the "primary agent" for special services.150 As "primary agent," the local district is expected to observe educational regulations, and it is therefore reasonable to expect the local district, not the
state office, to be held accountable for its observance or lack of observance of these regulations.
In sum, the court in Peter W, the majority in Donohue, and the
Illinois Supreme Court in Pierce dismissed complaints because of an
extreme reluctance to recognize a standard of care which could form
the basis for a claim of educational malpractice. Further, insofar as
they excused the school districts' actions by placing a burden to exhaust
administrative remedies on the plaintiffs, the courts have indulged in a
quasi-contributory negligence decision. Weighing the school districts'
inaction against the plaintiffs' inaction is not appropriate at the pretrial
stage,' 5 1particularly where there are damages claimed which cannot be
redressed through the administrative remedy process. As educational
malpractice claims continue to be pursued, courts probably will abandon such transparent attempts to shield school districts and educational
personnel, and will recognize the right of handicapped children to
claim redress for harm suffered thereby.
Indeed, in Hoffman v. Board of Education,5 2 the plaintiff won
damages in the amount of $500,000' 3 in an educational malpractice
149. See Loughran v. Flanders, No. H77-649 (D. Conn. Apr. 18, 1979), where the court found
that exhaustion would be futile insofar as damages are claimed. Id., slip op. at 4-5.
150. "The local school district shall be considered the primary agent for the delivery of special
education services to exceptional children." Illinois Rules, supra note 136, art. II, § 2.03(1).
151. This is similar to Justice Suozzi's position in Donohue with regard to proximate cause.
See discussion in text accompanying note 134 supra.
152. 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1978). The plaintiff, Danny, was placed in classes
for the retarded in 1957, during his kindergarten year, on the basis of the results of a psychological
examination conducted by a psychologist employed by the school district. In his report, the psychologist stated that the child's severe speech and language problems may have affected the scored
intelligence level, and he recommended that the child's "intelligence should be re-evaluated
within a two-year period so that a more accurate estimation of his abilities can be made." Id. at
102. There was no formal reassessment of Danny's intelligence until 1969, and during the intervening years, he attended public school programs for the retarded. The evaluation conducted in
1969, when Danny was eighteen years of age, found that he possessed intellectual skills within the
normal, or average, range but academic skills far below this range. He was unable to adjust to
social expectations such as finding and retaining employment, and he suffered emotional reactions
requiring psychiatric care. Suit was brought when Danny was twenty-six.
153. The plaintiffs had been awarded $750,000 by the jury in the New York Supreme Court,
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suit decided by the same court which had ruled on Donohue only three
months earlier. In Hoffman, the alleged wrong was the incorrect place154
ment of the child rather than a lack of placement, as in Donohue.
Following his placement in classes for the retarded, Danny Hoffman
was not retested until twelve years later, despite a recommendation in
the psychological report that his "intelligence should be re-evaluated
within a two-year period . . . . -55 This failure to re-evaluate Danny
was contended to be negligent on the part of the school district, as was
his original incorrect placement, resulting in emotional and vocational
damages to the plaintiff.
The defendant school district argued that "re-evaluation" was an
ongoing process on the part of Danny's teachers, and that since his academic performance continued to be poor, there had been no reason for
him to be retested. However, the court held that since it was Danny's
intelligence that was to be re-evaluated, retesting was necessarily implied. 15 6 It distinguished this result from that in Donohue on the basis
that the latter was a case of nonfeasance, rather than misfeasance as in
Hoffman,157 where the defendant failed to follow its own recommendation to re-evaluate.
The difference between nonfeasance and misfeasance raised by the
court as a basis for an educational malpractice claim is difficult to understand. Justice Martuscello, in his dissent in Hoffman,'5" acknowledged that it was conceivable that a case of educational malpractice
could be established for an act of misfeasance.1 59 However, he felt that
there was merit in the defendant's contention that there was continuing
evaluation of Danny by his teachers, and he therefore would have dismissed the complaint. 60 Dissenting Justice Damiani, who wrote the
majority opinion in Donohue, would have recognized no difference between nonfeasance and misfeasance.' 6' However, he insisted that the
principles of stare decisis required the court to follow its earlier decision in Donohue that a duty does not exist upon which an educational
162
malpractice claim may be asserted.
but the appellate division of that court reduced the amount to $500,000 while affirming the prior
holding. 410 N.Y.S.2d at I11.
154. Id. at 102.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 107.
157. Id. at 110.
158. Id. at 11 (Martuscello, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 113.
160. Id. at 117.
161. Id. at 118 (Damiani, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 118-19.
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The Peter W., Donohue, Pierce and Hoffman cases were all decided by state courts relying on state statutes, rather than on the
EAHCA. In Loughran v. Flanders, 63 however, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dismissed a complaint based
on the EAHCA. Plaintiffs, a student and his parents, sought one million dollars in damages, alleging emotional trauma due to the local
school board's negligence in failing to provide an appropriate special
education program for the student. The court in Loughran found that
the EAHCA does not contain an implied cause of action for damages.t64 Section 1415(e)(2) of the EAHCA 65 was interpreted to constitute a grant of only limited jurisdiction, that of reviewing claims of
error in evaluation or placement or of denial of procedural safeguards.' 66 The district court therefore decided that the standards set
forth for determining whether a private damage remedy is implicit in a
statute not expressly providing one, as set forth in the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Cori v. Ash, 16 7 should be applied. The
court in Loughran found that these standards were not satisfied and
therefore dismissed the claim.
There are several problems with the court's analysis in the Loughran case. In Cort, the United States Supreme Court discussed several
situations in which a private cause of action may be implied. One such
situation exists where a private suit for declaratory relief is authorized; 68 in such a situation, a private suit for damages may be implied
without application of further standards. The EAHCA recognizes a
163. No. H77-649 (D. Conn. Apr. 18, 1979).
164. Id., slip op. at 2.
165. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1976) states in pertinent part:
Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made. . . shall have the right to bring
a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this section, which
action may be brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court
of the United States without regard to the amount in controversy. In any action brought
under this paragraph the court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall ear ad itional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on
the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.
166. No. H77-649, slip op. at 6 (D. Conn. Apr. 18, 1979).
167. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The four standards, as phrased in Loughran, are:
(1) whether the plaintiff is one of a class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, (2) whether there is any legislative intent either explicit or implicit to create or
deny such a remedy, (3) whether it is consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy, (4) whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law in an area basically the concern of the states so that it
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law.
No. H77-649, slip op. at 6-7 (D. Conn. Apr. 18, 1979).
168. The Court referred to J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964): "[Tlhere was at least a
statutory basis for inferring that a civil cause of action of some sort lay in favor of someone." 422
U.S. at 79. "[A] private suit for declaratory relief was authorized." Id. at 79 n. 11.
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private cause of action for declaratory and/or injunctive relief for
plaintiffs who continue to be aggrieved after pursuing hearings within
the educational system.169 Therefore, a private suit for damages under
the EAHCA should be recognized without recourse to the other standards for an implied cause of action.
Second, although the court found no legislative intent to allow a
private cause of action for damages under the EAHCA, 170 Congress
stated in section 1415(e)(2) that "[alny party aggrieved by the findings
and decision made. . . shall have the right to bring a civil action ....
[T]he court shall. . . grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate."171 Damages could certainly fall within the range of appropriate relief, indicating an expectation that a private claim for damages
may be filed.
Third, the court expressed concern that allowing educational malpractice suits would be detrimental to the special education services
which the EAHCA was designed to encourage, 172 in that administrators would refuse to institute programs for fear of liability in the event
of failure. However, since the act requires that special education services be provided, administrators cannot lawfully refuse such services.
Further, liability attaches when there has been injury, and it is difficult
to believe that qualified personnel will institute or continue programs
which are injurious to children. If they do so, then it is only proper that
an educational malpractice claim be allowed.
Finally, the court in Loughran stated that "[t]he claim for damages
necessarily hinges upon questions of methodology and educational priorities, issues not appropriate for resolution by this Court. . .. ,173 In
fact, the claim made in this case was that in failing to provide an appropriate educational program for the student, 174 the school district caused
emotional trauma to him and his parents. Emotional trauma is a damage which has been measured by judges and juries for many years, and
does not require specialized educational expertise. Where the injury
claimed is based upon an alleged violation of a statutory standard, the
court need only decide whether that standard was met. Even should
169. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1976), supra note 165.
170. No. 77-649, slip op. at 8-10 (D. Conn. Apr. 18, 1979).
171. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1976).
172. No. 77-649, slip op. at 10 (D. Conn. Apr. 18, 1979).
173. Id. at 12.
174. Since the plaintiffs and defendant school district agreed upon an educational program for
the student subsequent to the filing of the complaint, and since the defendants did not contend
that the student had been appropriately served at all times, it may be inferred that they did indeed
fail to provide an appropriate program prior to their agreement with the student and his parents.
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some educational expertise be required, such expertise is as readily
available to the court as is the highly specialized and technical information required in adjudicating many medical malpractice claims.
It appears, therefore, that courts will soon begin to recognize valid
educational malpractice claims. Although most claims are brought
against school districts, 7" employees of the districts could also be sued.
Exceptional care will be demanded in order to protect and advance the
rights of individual handicapped children while guarding educational
personnel against the harassment of frequent liability actions.
THE FUTURE OF EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE IN SPECIAL
EDUCATION

Based on cases to date, there are two caveats that potential plaintiffs should observe in educational malpractice actions. First, plaintiffs
should be diligent in learning about the duties of the public schools
toward students and in pursuing available alternatives for special educational resources and placement through administrative procedures.
Second, plaintiffs should base their causes of action on a violation of a
statutory duty whenever possible, such as the EAHCA or state statutes
designed to implement the federal law. State departments of education
also issue regulations and procedures, which have the force of law, to
implement such statutes. 176 In order to claim a violation of a statutory
duty as evidence of negligence, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
statute was intended to protect the class of persons represented by the
plaintiff and that failure to perform the duty occasioned the type of
77
harm against which the statute was intended to protect. 1
An example of such an enactment might be a requirement that
when a child is referred for evaluation for possible special education
needs, the evaluation and the subsequent conference to develop an educational plan for the child must be completed within sixty school days
of the referral date. 78 The persons protected by the regulation are the
poorly-achieving students; the time limit is designed to avoid long periods in a standard program where the students are unable to realize
their full learning potential. The harm resulting from failure to comply
is that children fail to progress academically and fall further and fur175. The school district would have a "deeper pocket" than the individual professional, leading to the possibility of a larger award which is more likely to be collected.
176. E.g., Illinois Rules, supra note 136.
177. See note 105 supra.
178. See, e.g., Illinois Rules, supra note 136, art. IX, § 9.20.
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ther behind. This may generate negative emotional reactions, 79 as
well as future lack of employable skills, situations which the regulation
was intended to avoid. The school district might be sued for failing to
assure that the sixty-day limit was observed, or a school psychologist
for failing to conduct the evaluation within the required time.
The large number of statutory requirements and regulations in the
area of special education suggests that this is a particularly fertile area
for future litigation. When the number of potential plaintiffs' 80 is considered in conjunction with these requirements, the number of possible
lawsuits increases exponentially. For example, the definition of a
learning disabled child in the EAHCA states that such children "hive a
disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in
understanding or in using language, spoken or written, which disorder
may manifest itself in imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read,
write, spell, or do mathematical calculations."' 8' If "imperfect ability"
in an area denotes below-average performance, then half of all school
children could claim at least the right to an evaluation, since theoretically half the population: would score below the fiftieth percentile.
Reflection on these numerous possibilites suggests why the law of
torts has been described as "a battleground of social theory."'' 82 Allowing the public schools to become ungoverned participants in this
battleground will evoke responses detrimental to society which may
well outweigh in importance the individual wrongs for which redress is
sought in specific lawsuits. The accountability involved in the possibility of legal liability could work to improve, to a degree, the negative
results of excessive bureaucracy in school situations. However, this
would apply chiefly to suits against school districts. Suits against individuals employed by those school districts, on the other hand, could
interfere with effective educational programs. Members of the educational profession can hardly be expected to function optimally under
the Damoclean sword of the ungoverned threat of litigation. It is the
179. See Caspari, A Psychodynamic View of the Therapeutic Opportunities ofSpecial Education,
in ORIENTATIONS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 123 (K. Wedell ed. 1975).

180. The Bureau of Education for the Handicapped estimates that eight million children in
the United States need special education services, and that only about half of these are being
served. S. REP. No. 94-168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1975) reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1425, 1432. The estimate of the number of children in need of such services is usually
about ten percent of the school population. See Keogh, Social and Ethical Assumptions About
Special Education, in ORIENTATIONS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 7 (K. Wedell ed. 1975); S. KIRK,
EDUCATING EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 24 (1962). These estimates indicate that providing special
education services is a major item in a school district's budget.

181. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(15) (1976).
182. PROSSER, supra note 15, § 3, at 14-15.
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students who suffer most when their teachers function less than optimally. Further, at its extreme, if the threat is frequent and strong, older
members may be prompted to leave the profession while fewer young
people may be attracted to it, since it is unlikely that salaries in public
school settings could be increased to a sufficiently attractive level to
compensate for the threat. 83 Should these tendencies bring about a
shortage of personnel, universities could be forced to lower admissions
criteria and standards for teacher training programs in order to induce
more individuals to enter the field. The result would be a poorer caliber of education professionals. Such a result would impact on the
schoolchildren, who would receive poorer instruction and academic
training, as well as on society, for those children would enter society
less well prepared to assume the responsibilities of citizenship. Also, as
the number of claims increases, the cost of professional liability insurance increases. Where school districts are required to indemnify their
employees, 84 the increase in insurance premiums would necessitate increased financial support for schools or a reduction in monies devoted
to direct student services. Again, the same detrimental effects on children and society would ensue. The whole of society therefore suffers if
the balance between societal needs and those of individual members is
disturbed through litigation or judicial interference.
On the other hand, a student's individual rights are too precious to
be derogated by granting no remedy for deprivation of those rights. A
tax supported social institution such as the public school system should
not be allowed to operate in a totally unfettered fashion, free to devote
its resources in the most financially expedient manner, with little regard
for its responsibilities. Allowing the assertion of meritorious claims
will prompt educational personnel to function more effectively and will
operate as a balance between the competing interests of the school system and those of the children it serves.
The judiciary will have to observe scrupulous care in opening the
way to educational malpractice claims, in order to allow valid claims
while preventing the public waste and negative societal effects which
attend groundless or frivolous litigation. It is suggested that special ed-

183. One possible reason why the threat of medical malpractice actions may not have decreased the number of applicants to medical schools is that such a threat is offset by the higher
level of income which graduates of those schools can expect to earn. A graduate of a teacher
training institution, however, cannot expect financial compensation approaching that of a doctor
of medicine.
184. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-20.20 (1977).
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ucation malpractice claims should be permitted where the following
minimum criteria have been met:
(1) Available administrative remedies have been exhausted. 185 Although this should not preclude the possibility of a negligence action,
it will ensure that proper placement has been effected so that damages do not continue to accrue.
(2) The duty of care is readily apparent and clearly defined. While a
lucid statutory requirement would satisfy this standard, professional
expectations would seldom do so, since these are vague and for the
most part undefined,86unless the violation appears to be particularly
flagrant or wanton.1
(3) The alleged breach is a definite act or failure to act. Nonfeasance
with regard to a mandatory duty would satisfy this standard better
than an allegation of misfeasance in performing a professional responsibility. For example, failure to complete an evaluation of a
child within sixty school days is easily established, 8 7 whereas demonstrating that a spelling program was poorly planned is unlikely to
be successful.
(4) The damages resulting from the alleged breach are clearly
demonstrated and carefully documented. Where this documentation
is questionable, the action for damages should be dismissed.
Finally, where a case has advanced to trial and a decision in favor
of the plaintiff has been reached, financial awards should be carefully
scrutinized. 18 8 The plaintiff should be reimbursed for clearly documented damages, but it must be borne in mind that awards levied
against a school district affect public funds derived from taxpayers either directly or indirectly, such as through increased liability insurance
premiums. In either case, the overall financial resources remaining
available for educating all the students in the system will be reduced.
CONCLUSION

Handicapped children have been granted not only access to education equal to that of their nonhandicapped peers, but also safeguards
which go beyond those for children attending the standard program.
These safeguards, when violated or poorly observed, may provide the
basis for a personal damage action, an educational malpractice suit, by
a handicapped child or his parents. The availability of such lawsuits
185. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.506-121a.510 (1977). At present, there are only two steps in the
appeal process-an impartial due process hearing and an appeal to the state office. Should the
disputed special services be provided at this point, it is still possible that documentable damages
have been suffered prior to the hearings.
186. E.g., Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
187. See note 178 supra and accompanying text.
188. E.g., Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (appellate
court reduced the amount of damages awarded at trial from $750,000 to $500,000).
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can serve as a check on the impersonal, unbridled bureaucracy of
school systems. Nonetheless, the unconditional use of such lawsuits
could provoke an imbalance between the individual and the system
which would be detrimental to other schoolchildren and the community at large.
Therefore, safeguards to control the litigation of educational malpractice suits must be imposed. Observation of such safeguards should
facilitate the orderly conduct of the educational process, so that the
individual's need for protection is balanced by the overall good to society. The result will be to improve education for all children, not only
the handicapped, and thereby enhance society as a whole.
FAYE M. COULTAS

